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As darkness was to hide the parties from the judges of the
Areopag, in our court it would at least serve the purpose of
hiding from the parties judges who shy from the light.
- Anselm von Feuerbach'
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the
decision here. . . . Then I propose we postpone further dis-
cussion of this matter until our next meeting to give our-
selves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some
understanding of what the decision is all about.
- Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.2
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The increasingly commonplace practice of filing dissenting
opinions in investment arbitration awards has come under consid-
erable scrutiny in recent years.3 Are dissenting opinions symp-
1. Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 Am. J.
Comp. L. 415, 429-430 (1959) (citing Anselm von Feuerbach, Betrachtungen fiber die
Offentlichkeit und Mfindlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege 145 (1821)).
2. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 472
(1974) (quoting Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.).
3. Although we limit our comments in this article to international investment
arbitration (as most commentators on this issue have), the controversy related to
dissenting opinions also extends to commercial arbitration. However, as numerous
commentators have noted, the more widespread confidentiality in commercial
arbitration makes any analysis inherently impractical. The greater transparency and
development of persuasive precedent in investment arbitration, as shall be more fully
elaborated, renders that arena a more ripe field for inquiry. See Tai-Heng Cheng,
Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1014,
1014-15 (2006-2007) ("Unlike international commercial arbitrations between two
private corporations, which are generally confidential; investment treaty arbitrations
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toms of a systematic dysfunction arising from a flawed party-
appointed arbitrator rubric, or rather a reflection of the increasing
maturity of investment arbitration as an institution of global dis-
pute resolution? Is an assessment of the role of the doctrine of dis-
sent in public international law possible without considering the
doctrine's standing as part of customary public international law?
Are dissents necessary to a jurisprudence of arbitral decisional
law wanting in precedential value? Can the viability of the doc-
trine of dissent be meaningfully assessed without considering the
role of arbitrators in public international law?
Numerous commentators, including the noted arbitrator prac-
titioner Albert Jan van den Berg in a recent article, have reignited
this debate.' In his critical study, van den Berg relies exclusively
on a descriptive-empirical analysis in an effort to curtail a per-
ceived "leniency" in the issuance of dissenting opinions within the
ambit of investor-state arbitration.' His contribution raises the
question of whether such a methodology is at all helpful to a doc-
trinal evaluation of dissenting opinions within the framework of
public international law.
In many ways, investment arbitration's vertiginous and
omnidirectional growth over the past two decades has been
remarkably organic, marked by gradual, barely-noticeable evolu-
tions at times, but jarred occasionally by raucous reformations
and counter-reformations.6 Indeed, it is reasonable and accurate
are subject to lower levels of confidentiality. In many investment treaty arbitrations,
parties have either unilaterally published the awards or consented to the
administering arbitral institution publishing the awards. With disclosure comes
public scrutiny.").
4. See, e.g., Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed
Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821-843 (M. Arsanjani, J.
Katz Cogan, R. Sloane, & S. Wiessner eds.) (2010).
5. Id. at 821.
6. The proliferation of arbitral jurisprudence arguably has spawned more
questions than answers to pivotal issues defining the very contours of international
investment law. Indeed, the discipline of investment-state arbitration is witnessing
the issuance of reasoned awards leading either to doctrinally inconclusive results, or
even flatly to conflicting findings of law and the application of law to fact. Compare
SGS v. Pakistan, Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, with SGS v. Philippines, Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004 (regarding the scope of
umbrella clauses); and Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/0517, Award, 30
June 2009, with GEA v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08116, Award, 31 March 2011
(regarding whether commercial arbitration award constitutes an "investment" under
the ICSID framework as well as customary and conventional international law).
These cases are but a few of a universe of numerous examples. Because of the nature
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to assert that investment arbitration is in a state of constant reor-
ganization. As this dispute resolution component of a network of
approximately 3,000 bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties
continues to attain institutional status as a necessary counterpart
to economic globalization, important developments become dis-
cernible. Among these newly emerging principles, perhaps the
most significant is the use of investment arbitration awards as
authority or precedent - a practice that commands sustained
analysis.
Arbitral jurisprudence is not generated within a framework
that bestows on it the normative value of precedent, or stare deci-
sis. Despite this anomaly, the inexorable trend appears to be in
favor of according greater attention to prior decisions issued by
investment arbitration tribunals.' Describing this development,
one commentator observed that "although arbitrators in invest-
ment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in
the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but
powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to
account for prior published awards and to stabilize international
investment law."8 Similarly, the ICSID tribunal in Saipem v. Ban-
gladesh described this phenomenon as follows:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous
decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must
pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international
tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a
series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to
the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of
the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to
meet the legitimate expectations of the community of
of the issues addressed, however, and the starkly inapposite rulings, they are
eloquent examples of the "multidirectional" proliferation of arbitral decisional law.
7. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward of Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51
W. & M. L. REV. 1985 (2010).
8. Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1014, 1016 (2006-2007). Notably, Cheng concludes that this
informal system "imperfectly supports the relevant policy goals" of investment
arbitration. Id. Consequently, he proposes that: (a) the system of precedent is clarified
and publicized to enable the global community to appraise awards and the arbitrators
who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of
arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient
informal self-regulation and self-selection. Id. Although precedent in investment
arbitration, per se, is not the subject of this article, Cheng's proposals are inseparable
from the thesis of this article, developed infra.
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States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.9
Assuming that arbitrators must "pay due consideration" to prior
awards in order, among other goals, to "contribute to the harmoni-
ous development of investment law," there is little doubt that the
proliferation of investment arbitration awards, particularly in the
ICSID context, has led to fundamental transformations as to
advocacy and arbitral deliberation. This development is rendered
all the more astonishing when considering the previous resistance
and hostility to the use of "awards as legitimate sources of author-
ity and arbitrators as legitimate producers of law."o As shall be
discussed, not being "bound" by previous decisions, but vested
with an imperative to consider prior awards, carves out a unique
normative space for investor-state arbitral awards, much like the
doctrine of comity.
The welcome dialogue regarding the desirability of dissenting
or separate opinions in investment arbitration awards may
represent a further development in arbitration's advancement,
undoubtedly correlated with the rise of precedent-based reasoning
and argument in investment arbitration. This contribution seeks
to explore the following premises: (i) the extent to which the devel-
opment of arbitral decisional law in a new normative space inter-
faces with the doctrine of dissent; (ii) how the role of arbitrators
dispensing justice in the administration of public international
law relates to dissenting opinions; (iii) the effect of customary
international law on the normative standing of dissents; and (iv)
the connection between dissents and principles of transparency
that are common in and attendant to public international law. It
is here assumed that a descriptive, empirically grounded explora-
tion of the role of dissents in public international law, without
more, is limited in its ability to assess the doctrine's proper work-
ings. As a predicate to exploring these propositions, a review of
the history of dissenting opinions in the Anglo-American system
and a brief survey of the use of dissents in non-common law legal
systems is necessary if the doctrine of dissents is to be properly
contextualized.
9. Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Recommendation on Provisional Measures 67 (Mar. 21, 2007). Notably, the
Saipem panel included among the most noted luminaries in the investment
arbitration firmament: Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Christoph H. Schreuer, and Sir
Philip Otton.
10. See Weidemaier, supra note 6, at 1938.
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II. THEORIES OF DISSENT
A surprising number of commentators qualify the appearance
of dissenting opinions in international arbitration as an unwel-
come importation of Anglo-American common law doctrine and
practices. Even a surface review of the emergence and develop-
ment of modern dissenting opinions in the Anglo-American legal
systems reveals a much more complex and cross-cultural land-
scape." Indeed, even though the promulgation of dissenting or
separate opinions is now commonplace in the administration of
justice by judicial tribunals, the practice has waxed and waned
parallel to the judiciary's institutional needs. In order to canvas
the significance of contemporary judicial dissenting opinions, it is
helpful to consider the manner in which the doctrine developed.
This narrative reveals the multifaceted effects that dissents have
on decision-making authority.
A. The Anglo-American Experience
Dissents have attained considerable stature in the Anglo-
American legal tradition. This status, however, should not be con-
strued as supporting the proposition that this hallowed place is
the product of consistency. The opposite is true. No fewer than
three methods of decision-making alternatively have prevailed
among judicial tribunals in the United States and England over
the last three hundred years:
The first is the seriatim delivery of the judgment of each
judge individually. This practice prevailed in Great Britain
for nearly all of its history, from the time of William the
Conqueror to the present day. It also was common in U.S.
courts (both state and federal) at the Founding. The second
is delivering an "opinion of the court," with no publicly
revealed vote or separate opinions. This practice has been
used twice: by Lord Mansfield of the King's Bench in
England and (more or less) by John Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Finally, the modern practice in the United
States is a hybrid, in which an opinion of a majority of the
court is issued, but judges decide individually whether to
"write separately."1 2
Throughout their recent history, Anglo-American courts intermit-
11. See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1922); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1909).
12. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 283, 292 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
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tently have entertained each of these methods, alternating
between periods of consensus and unanimity and phases of
increasing public division.'" Significantly, in each instance these
shifts, regardless of direction, were intended "to increase the
power of the Court specifically and the law generally."14
Chief Justice John Marshall's abandonment of seriatim opin-
ions and adoption of "unanimous and anonymous opinions" ele-
vated the fledgling Court, permitting more effective management
of its public and political image, giving its opinions greater
authority, and shielding individual justices from harsh scrutiny. 1
Although the total unanimity of the earlier Marshall years would
be short-lived, the consensus imperative remained in place for
over 100 years until 1941, with the rate of dissents remaining less
than 10% during that period.' 6
Just as the chief justiceship of John Marshall is credited for
the "unanimity norm", the chief justiceship of Harlan Stone is con-
sidered responsible for the rise of dissents." Considering this
development a product of Chief Justice Stone's leadership, Hen-
derson observed:
Law was now more like politics, and Stone was willing to
assert the Supreme Court as a political branch. Stone
achieved this revolution in part by encouraging the use of
dissenting opinions, just as Marshall implemented his
revolution by introducing consensus. The means were dif-
ferent, but the ends were the same.
Stone increased the power of the Court, and thus achieved
the same results as Marshall, but for different reasons and
in different circumstances. Both Marshall and Stone
sought a more active role for the Court. To increase the
power of the Court specifically and the law generally, Stone
encouraged debate and controversy, rather than sup-
pressing it as Marshall was required to do, to accomplish
the same end."
This critical association between the authority of judicial decision-
making institutions and the manner in which their decisions are
reasoned is precisely the subject that must be considered in the
13. See id. at 292.
14. Id. at 329.
15. Id. at 319.
16. Id. at 322.
17. Id. at 326 (citing Thomas Walker, et al., On the Mysterious Demise of
Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362 (1988)).
18. Henderson, supra note 12, at 330.
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context of investment arbitration. Only by underscoring this con-
nection can the doctrine of dissents be appropriately contextual-
ized. To conclude that division must inherently lead to diminished
authority is both overtly and excessively simplistic. The experi-
ence of the U.S. Supreme Court (the authority of which has ebbed
and flowed throughout its history despite its varying approaches
to the question of unanimity") demonstrates that the relationship
between dissents and the authority and/or normative foundation
afforded to decision-makers is exceptionally complex and varies
depending on the circumstances.
Despite the widespread acceptance of judicial dissents, schol-
ars continue to ask whether "dissent [is] a symptom of a dysfunc-
tional Court or of a healthy one."20 Historical opposition to the
airing of dissenting judicial opinions in the United States has a
notable pedigree. The prevalence of such opinions has fluctuated
throughout the American judiciary's history. As the judiciary
gradually emerged from its post-Marshall Court emphasis on una-
nimity, skepticism abounded. Former President and later-Chief
Justice William Howard Taft pointedly observed, "I don't approve
of dissents generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from
the majority, it is more important to stand by the Court and give
its judgment weight than merely to record my individual dissents
where it is better to have the law certain than to have it settled
either way."21 Presaging the arguments of contemporary oppo-
nents of dissenting opinions in investment arbitration, Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes explained to a colleague on the Court
his reluctance to dissent in a lethally disarming tone: "I choke a
little at swallowing your analysis; still I do not think it would
serve any useful purpose to expose my views."22
In contrast to these concerns, Justice William J. Brennan
acknowledges the drawbacks of dissenting opinions, while never-
theless studiously describing them as a "duty."2 3 "Some contend,"
he notes, "that the dissent is an exercise in futility, or, worse still,
a 'cloud' on the majority decision that detracts from the legitimacy
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert A. Ferguson ed.,
2006). See also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986).
20. Henderson, supra note 12, at 285.
21. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 61 (1964).
22. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 224 (1986)
23. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 438
(1985-1986).
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that the law requires and from the prestige of the institution that
issues the law."24 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan observes, "una-
nimity in itself is not a virtue."25
As Justice Brennan notes, Chief Justice Hughes ultimately
developed a rather nuanced view of dissents:
When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of con-
viction, it strongly commends the decision to public confi-
dence. But unanimity which is merely formal, which is
recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not
desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the
effect upon public opinion at the time [the case is
announced]. This is so because what must ultimately sus-
tain the court in public confidence is the character and
independence of the judges. They are not there simply to
decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should
be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they can-
not always agree, it is better that their independence
should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity
should be secured through its sacrifice.26
While this statement would seem to stand in stark contrast with
Chief Justice Hughes' earlier remarks, the two are easily recon-
ciled. In fact, Chief Justice Hughes shines light upon the thought
process of the responsible dissenter. While not explicitly engaged
in a defense of dissents, Chief Justice Hughes amply establishes
that dissents are defensible, particularly when employed
judiciously.
In the course of his own defense of dissents, Justice Brennan
identifies three models of dissent in the United States Supreme
Court. The first "demonstrates the flaws the author perceives in
the majority's legal analysis" and is offered "in the hope that the
Court will mend the error of its ways."27 Such dissents, Brennan
argues, are premised on the belief that "vigorous debate improves
the final product by forcing the prevailing side to deal with the
hardest questions urged by the losing side."28 The second model of
dissent, used to "emphasize the limits of a majority decision that
sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned, unnecessarily
broadly," may serve "to furnish litigants . . . with practical gui-
24. Brennan, supra note 23, at 429.
25. Id. at 432.
26. CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68
(1928), quoted in Brennan, supra note 23, at 434.
27. Brennan, supra note 23, at 430.
28. Id.
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dance - such as ways of distinguishing subsequent cases."29
The third model of dissent Justice Brennan identifies "seek[s]
to sow seeds for future harvesting."30 These, he notes, are often the
"most enduring. "31 Undoubtedly, several such dissents have
entered the pantheon of American jurisprudence, perhaps most
famously Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, where the Justice emphatically rejected the majority's
adoption of the "separate but equal" doctrine regarding racial seg-
regation. 32 Although this third model of dissent would seem to
have no place in a world without binding precedent, the opposite
may in fact be true. Alternatively, the first two models identified
by Justice Brennan could be very impactful to the extent that they
permit more thorough analysis and thus more fully reasoned deci-
sions in whatever context.
B. Globalized Dissents
Opponents have attempted to label dissenting opinions purely
as creatures of the Anglo-American legal culture, thereby elevat-
ing the supposedly "general" civil law approach, which disallows
dissenting opinions purportedly "because of their emphasis on col-
legiality in the dispensation of justice."33 However, it is apparent
that attempts to dismiss dissents as a parochial common law
carry-over fall far short of the mark.34 The universality of dissents
cannot be meaningfully challenged. The record demonstrates that
just as Anglo-American courts have long experimented with dif-
ferent approaches to dissenting opinions, so too have the courts of
civil law jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the literature opposing dis-
sents in arbitration is rife with such general assertions that
29. Id.
30. Id. at 431.
31. Id. at 430.
32. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Van den Berg, supra note 4, at 822. See also Alan Redfern, Dissenting
Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
20 ARB. INT'L 223, 224 (2004) ("There is no tradition of dissenting opinions in the civil
law. It was thought that a court's decision should appear as the decision of the court
as a whole, rather than as a mathematical process by which one party emerged as the
winner, having gained more votes than his or her adversary. Dissenting opinions
have come to international commercial arbitration as a gift of the common law. Many
may rejoice at the way in which different legal procedures and traditions are mixed
together to build what Sir Michael Kerr called 'the emerging common procedural
pattern in international arbitration.' It is doubtful, however, whether the dissenting
opinion has added much, if anything, of value to the arbitral process.")
34. Id.
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largely remain untested.35
In his influential and early comparative study of dissenting
opinions, Kurt Nadelmann analyzed the evolution of dissents in
numerous legal systems. 36 Nadelmann's study is particularly
revealing as it demonstrates a more widespread and pronounced
usage of dissenting opinions beyond the former British Common-
wealth and Empire." Indeed, far from being a new development,
public decision-making and judgments were the norm under early
Germanic and Roman procedure.3 8 Secrecy of deliberation and
result, Nadelmann asserts, originated in "later Roman and later
canonist procedure."39
At the time of Nadelmann's study, German courts strictly
observed a rule requiring them to keep deliberations, and there-
fore dissents, secret.40 In the intervening years, however, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has returned to the practice of issuing
dissenting opinions.4 1 In what actually constitutes an anomalous
practice, the courts of several Swiss Cantons maintained the early
Germanic custom of "deliberating and voting in public."42 Scandi-
navian courts have a long-standing tradition of separate opinions.
Surveying that region, Nadelmann found that Norway's Supreme
Court has employed separate opinions since 1864, while Sweden,
Finland, and Denmark permit judges to dissent.4 3 Spanish courts
also have a mechanism through which a dissenting judge may reg-
ister her opposing vote.44
French courts, often held as representing the most consistent
and committed paradigm of unanimous and anonymous opinion
writing,4 5 briefly departed from this custom in the immediate
35. See id.
36. Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 417-418.
37. Id. at 417-418 (With respect to the former British Commonwealth and Empire,
Nadelmann observes that the writing of separate opinions remains "in operation in all
parts of the British Commonwealth and Empire, even where, as in Quebec, the civil
law prevails. India and Pakistan have retained the practice.").
38. Id. at 415.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Van den Berg, supra note 4, at 822 n.7.
42. Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 416.
43. Id. at 418. "In Sweden and Finland, a judge may announce his dissent and give
the reasons for it. In Denmark, dissents have been noted in the judgment since 1937,
and the names of the dissenters since 1958." Id.
44. Id. at 420 (citing, e.g., Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, art. 156 (2), 157
(1882)).
45. United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg relates the
following story regarding a meeting held in Paris between her and two other Supreme
Court colleagues and members of the Conseil d'Etat:
2012] 455
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aftermath of the French Revolution, even though they promptly
returned to it a few short years later.46 Echoing the diverse views
expressed in the modern debate concerning dissents in arbitra-
tion, the abandonment of secret deliberations in France following
the Revolution was driven by "distrust of the courts by the
masses," and the return to secrecy only a few years later was moti-
vated by concerns regarding "undignified scenes" caused by open
deliberations.4 7 The French secrecy model also was adopted in
other European jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Italy.48
In addition to the apparent widespread adoption of dissenting
or separate opinions as a matter of domestic judicial decision-
making in both civil and common law jurisdictions, commentators
also point to the widespread adoption of dissents by international
courts and other quasi-judicial decision making bodies. These
institutions include: ICSID, the Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
nal, the International Court of Justice (and its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice), the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Criminal Court,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of
Human Rights.4 9
Early in our second session, Justice O'Connor described the
doctrine current in the United States concerning the respect or
deference courts owe to decisions or rules made by expert
administrative agencies or officials. Courts are bound to accept an
administrative agency's construction of the statute the agency is
charged to enforce, Justice O'Connor reported, so long as the
agency's reading is a plausible one, even if not the only plausible
reading or, in the judge's view, the more or most plausible reading.'
How can that be, a French colleague asked. How can the law have
more than one plausible meaning? Or, more accurately, how can a
court judgment openly so acknowledge? The law is the law There
can be but one officially correct reading. Shouldn't judges, at least
in their official pronouncements, make it appear so to the public?
Isn't it the court's responsibility to identify by judgment the (one
and only) correct interpretation?
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990).
46. See Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 422-423.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed
Nightengale: Why the Paulsson-Van Den Berg Presumption that Party Appointed
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One facet of van den Berg's meticulous compilation of ICSID
cases in which dissents have been filed bears more careful consid-
eration."o To the extent that one accepts the wobbly premise that
dissenting opinions in investment arbitration are yet another pes-
tilence originating in common law practice, would it not be reason-
able to anticipate common law lawyers to dissent more frequently
than their civilian counterparts? With respect to this query, care-
ful analysis of the cases assembled by van den Berg is revealing.
Of the 34 dissenting arbitrators cited, a clear majority originate
from non-common law jurisdictions."' Further undercutting the
effort to narrowly characterize dissents as a common law off-
shoot, many of the first dissents submitted in ICSID arbitrations
were by arbitrators from non-common law jurisdiction.52
That dissenting or separate opinions are not solely a creature
of the Anglo-American legal tradition is beyond cavil. Not only
have dissenting opinions become a widely accepted element of
domestic judicial decision making in numerous non-common law
jurisdictions, such opinions also have become commonplace in
international adjudication. Thus, the proposition that dissenting
opinions reflect key cultural differences is but another element of
the "myth of culture clash in international arbitration."53
Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, at 25-26 (available at http://www.
cailaw.org/ita/2012winforum/browerrosenbergv2.pdf) (internal citations omitted).
50. See van den Berg, supra note 4, at 837-843. Van den Berg's table compiling
dissenting opinions in ICSID tribunal decisions has been adapted to reflect the
nationality of the identified arbitrators (as designated by ICSID) and is included as
the "Appendix" to this article.
51. These include: Grant Aldonas (U.S.A.), Guido Tawil (Argentina), Pedro
Nikken (Venezuela), Otto L.O. de Witt Wynen (Netherlands), Gary Born (U.S.A.),
Franklin Berman (U.K.), Marc Lalonde (Canada), Bernardo Cremades (Spain), Daniel
Price (U.S.A.), Ronald A. Cass (U.S.A.), Francisco Orrego Vicuna (Chile), Robert
Volterra (Canada), Domino Bello Janeiro (Spain), Todd Weiler (Canada), Horacio
Grigera Na6n (Argentina), lan Sinclair (U.K.), Thomas W. Walde (Germany), Jose
Luis Alberro-Semerana (Mexico), Jerzy Rajski (Poland), Yawovi Agboyibo (Togo),
Antonio Crivellaro (Italy), lan Brownlie (U.K.), Jorge Covarrubias Bravo (Mexico),
Bryan P. Schwartz (U.S.A.), David Suratgar (U.K.), Jaroslav Handl (Czech Republic),
Don Wallace Jr. (U.S.A.), Keith Highet (U.S.A.), Ivan Zykin (Russia), Heribert
Golsong (Germany), Keba Mbaye (Senegal), Mohamed Anim El Mahdi (Egypt),
Samuel K.B. Asante(Ghana), Dominique Schmidt (France). Country of origin was
determined based upon the national designations determined by ICSID.
52. These include: Herbert Golsong (Germany) (AMT v. Zaire) (February 21,
1997); Keba Mbaye (Senegal) (AMT v. Zaire) (February 21, 1997); Mohamed Anim El
Mahdi (Egypt) (SPP v. Egypt) (May 20, 1992); Dominique Schmidt (France) (Klockner
v. Cameroun) (October 21, 1983).
53. See generally John M. Barkett, The Myth of Culture Clash in International
Commercial Arbitration, 5 FIU L. REV. 1 (2009).
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C. Debating Dissents in Arbitration
Given the widespread acceptance of dissents in arbitration,
both in the rules and practice of numerous arbitration institu-
tions, it is apparent that a convergence, likely less arduous than
most critics of dissenting opinions have anticipated, has already
occurred. 4 To this end, much of the commentary surrounding the
role of dissents in arbitration seeks to achieve a "more perfect"
model of dissent, rather than to cast aside the practice altogether,
even though the most recent literature all but states that the doc-
trine of dissent finds no home in public international law.
Suggestive of Justice Brennan's identification of three catego-
ries of dissenting opinions in the jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court, Redfern also endeavors to divide dissents
in international arbitration into three categories, labeling each
"the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly."5 Although generally critical of
the effect of dissenting opinions, Redfern's rubric provides genuine
insights as to the status of dissenting opinions among arbitration
practitioners. "Good" dissents, Redfern notes, "may be short,
polite, and above all restrained so that the dissenter says: 'It is
with regret that I must dissent from the views of my learned col-
leagues,' followed by a few short, sharp sentences."56 The advan-
tage of "Good" dissents, so the argument goes, "is that they permit
an arbitrator to express disagreement, without what may be seen
as a show of conceit or petulance. And without imperiling the
authority of the award." 7
Although Redfern does not specifically define "Bad" dissents,
he suggests that such dissents would include those that more
pointedly attack the majority's reasoning." As one example of
such a dissent, Redfern cites an American appellate decision in
which the dissenting judge complained, "[i]n essence, what these
four judges have done here is to blindly announce a ... rule which
not only finds no support in history, precedent, experience, cus-
tom, practice, logic, reason, common sense or natural justice, but
54. See van den Berg, supra note 4, at 821 (citing Redfern, supra note 30, at 242)
("Dissenting opinions appear to have become an accepted practice in international
arbitration. The current debate concentrates on their procedure, form, and content.
Alan Redfern noted that '[a]t present, a generally relaxed attitude towards dissenting
opinions seems to be taken not only by the arbitral institutions, but also by the
arbitrators themselves."')
55. See Redfern, supra note 30, at 224-225.
56. Id. at 225.
57. Id. at 227.
58. Id.
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is in utter defiance of each and all of these standards.""9 In con-
trast to "Good" and merely "Bad" dissents, "Ugly" dissents are
those:
... in which the dissenting arbitrator - and it is almost
always an arbitrator, not a judge - does not merely disa-
gree with his or her colleagues on issues of fact or law, or on
their reasoning, but takes the opportunity of issuing a dis-
senting opinion to attack the way in which the arbitration
itself was conducted. The dissenting arbitrator complains,
unrestrainedly and in print, that his or her views were
ignored, that he or she was never properly consulted, that
the majority arbitrators were ignorant of the law and
biased from the outset, and so forth. In short, the dissent-
ing arbitrator complains that the proper procedures were
not followed and that the majority arbitrators have failed to
behave as they should have behaved."
Redfern's concerns regarding "Ugly" dissents, rooted in preserving
the enforceability of awards, are perhaps most viable when consid-
ering the kind of improper arbitrator conduct that van den Berg
conjures in his own critical analysis." Brower and Rosenberg,
however, directly challenge this contention, rightfully noting that
"[u]njust arbitral awards based on manifest violations of the par-
ties' procedural rights, for example, deserve no such protection
from annulment or non-enforcement."6 2 Indeed, such a dissenting
opinion may have significant ameliorative effects:
A dissenting opinion that correctly discloses such a defect
will have served a useful purpose of preventing an unjust
award . . . where the dissenting opinion reveals serious
flaws which, otherwise, would have remained undisclosed,
is it really a bad thing that the parties and the appellate or
enforcement courts are able to vacate the award or to
refuse its enforcement?63
Notably, there is also ample evidence to suggest that an arbitra-
tor's failure to dissent may also subject the award to enforcement
59. Id. (citing Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 924
(1962)).
60. Redfern, supra note 30, at 228.
61. See van den Berg, supra note 4, at 828 ("A dissent should not be a platform for
preparing for annulment. If there is something wrong with either the award or the
procedure leading to it, the award itself and the record of the arbitration should
suffice for applying for annulment.").
62. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 44-45.
63. Id. (citing Peter J. Rees & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can they Fulfill
a Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. INT'L 329, 338-39 (2009).
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challenges.64
That the debate regarding the propriety of dissenting opin-
ions in arbitration generally, and investment arbitration in partic-
ular, has commenced is apparent given the diversity of well-
articulated views on the issue. Some commentators have struck a
forceful position in favor of such opinions by arguing, for example,
that dissents foster legimitacy in international arbitration,5 while
others have argued that dissents may in fact be improper, ineffec-
tual, if not actually deleterious.66 Van den Berg's recent article,
Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, clearly falls into the latter camp, and - given the con-
siderable debate it has reignited - merits careful consideration.
III. THE RISK OF MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES
In his treatment of the subject of dissents, van den Berg
explains that he "would like to explore the cautionary note with
which Redfern concluded his seminal article, namely, that the
'time has perhaps come to inquire whether the present leniency
towards dissenting opinions . . . has gone too far."' 67 Van den
Berg's descriptive-empirical analysis of the practice of dissent in
investor-state arbitrations may readily comport with Kant's pro-
nouncement that "experience without theory is blind, but theory
without experience is but a meaningless intellectual exercise."6
The effort undertaken in perusing this objective is primarily
premised on a case study of 150 publicly reported ICSID decisions
(jurisdictional and merits), of which 34 included dissenting opin-
ions. These dissenting opinions, he argues, in turn reflect that dis-
sents "are almost universally issued in favor of the party that
appointed the dissenter."69 Engaging in only limited analysis con-
cerning the content of the 34 dissents, van den Berg goes on to
64. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 45-48.
65. See, e.g., Laurence Shore & Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Dissents, Concurrences
and a necessary divide between investment and commercial arbitration, 3 GLOBAL
ARB. REV., 18, 20 (2008); Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 24-25; Richard M.
Mosk and Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration, 15-4
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 16 (2000).
66. See van den Berg, supra note 4; Redfern, supra note 30.
67. Id. at 821.
68. IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSIcs 5 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 2d ed. 2002) (1783). In that very same passage
Kant recalls confessing "that [his] remembering David Hume was the very thing that
many years ago first interrupted [Kant's] dogmatic slumber and gave [Kant's]
investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction." Id.
69. Id. at 824.
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argue against the four historically foundational propositions sup-
porting the use of dissenting opinions: (i) dissenting opinions are
conducive to better awards; (ii) the possibility of a dissenting opin-
ion ensures the majority's commitment to act responsibly; (iii)
party confidence in the system is bolstered by dissenting opinions;
and (iv) dissenting opinions nurse the development of arbitral
decisional law."0 Although superficially seductive, sustained anal-
ysis demonstrates that van den Berg's article, despite its title and
repeated pronouncements on the effects of dissents in investor-
state arbitrations, is not about the doctrine of dissent at all, but
rather with the contention that party-appointed arbitrators are
less than impartial.
This descriptive and empirical formulation fails to comment
in any determinative manner on the objective utility of dissents
because it does not segregate the issue of party-appointed arbitra-
tor neutrality from the viability of dissent in the realm of public
international law. If van den Berg has at all identified a shortcom-
ing, the insufficiency is in no way linked to the customary interna-
tional law practice of dissenting opinions. Even within the
confines of the basic inferences drawn from the 34 dissents in the
operative case study, it becomes readily apparent that the dys-
function rests with the inference that party-appointed arbitrators
might be independent but certainly are not impartial. Pursuant to
this argument, dissent craftsmanship is therefore merely a symp-
tom of a very deep and perhaps irreparable pathology.
Van den Berg relies on untested premises and assumptions
that further complicate his descriptive account of the world of dis-
senting opinions in investment-state arbitrations. An eloquent
example is advanced in the author's struggle to assert that "[o]ne
of the major problems with dissents by party-appointed arbitra-
tors is that they might inhibit the deliberative process."" In order
to support the proposition, van den Berg layers one assumption
after the next, constructing a theoretical party-appointed arbitra-
tor who believes that "he or she should support (or even improve)
the case advanced by the party that appointed him or her."7 2
Without the assumption of bias, the premise that dissents by
party-appointed arbitrators might inhibit or otherwise enervate
the deliberative process simply cannot be sustained.
The corollary to van den Berg's "straw arbitrator" who opines
70. Id. at 823.
71. Id. at 829.
72. Id.
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that "he or she should support (or even improve) the case
advanced by the party that appointed him or her,"7 3 is singularly
revealing: the "neutral and impartial arbitrator" does not perceive
herself as charged with the imperative of advancing an interest
other than the equitable administration of justice based upon
applicable law. This arbitrator applies her impartial judgment to
determine whether and how to dissent, free from any of the ills of
bias.
Van den Berg's empirical analysis merely provides a factual
foundation from which it may be inferred that where a party-
appointed arbitrator is not impartial or objective in evaluating
substantive and procedural merits, a dissent will reveal that arbi-
trator's lack of partiality. It must be underscored that the same
impartiality ascribed to the non-prevailing party-appointed arbi-
trator is shared by the prevailing party-appointed arbitrator.
The descriptive analysis that van den Berg advances is
equally unavailing in shedding light on the contributions of dis-
senting arbitrators to the majority opinion. It compellingly sug-
gests that dissenting arbitrators are either biased in favor of the
party who appointed them or otherwise misguided fundamentally
with respect to the standard that should govern their analysis and
deliberations. The extent to which van den Berg's exegesis on the
doctrine of dissent diverts to arbitral partiality or misapplication
of standards is captured in the following pronouncement: "In the
practice of dissents in investment arbitration may even have
reached the point where a party-appointed arbitrator is now
expected to dissent if the party that appointed him or her has lost
the case entirely or in part."74 Again, irrespective of whether the
proposition accurately captures a cultural development or expec-
tation in the realm of investor-state arbitral practice, this purely
descriptive account is certainly hapless as to any revelation
directly or indirectly related to the nature or character of dissent-
ing opinions. It does, however, quite emphatically capture what
might be a cultural partiality or misunderstanding concerning the
broader role and responsibility of arbitrators that regrettably may
pervade the practice.
Significantly absent from van den Berg's treatment of dis-
sents is any rigorous analysis regarding the role of arbitrators in
public international law and the doctrine of dissent. The differ-
ence between an arbitrator in an investor-state arbitration apply-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 830.
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ing public national law and a judge in a domestic national
proceeding militates in favor of application of dissents because of
the greater public policy responsibility engrafted upon the arbitra-
tor that in many ways dwarfs the national policy imperative
attendant to a judge presiding over a national judicial contention.
Van den Berg, however, only makes fleeting reference to this ana-
lytically helpful analogy. Specifically, his three sentence analysis
merely concludes that "[i]n contrast [to a judge], a party-appointed
arbitrator does not have the expectation that his or her dissent
would contribute to the development of investment law because,
as noted above, those dissents virtually never are relied upon in
subsequent investment cases."" Even assuming this proposition
to be accurate, which hardly can be determinative because a con-
ceptual or doctrinal reliance on a dissent may be most effective
when not explicitly stated for a number of reasons, the proposition
is circular. An inquiry into the nature of dissents must be free of
underlying assumptions of partiality used to reconcile a consistent
and empirical phenomenon, i.e., that dissents are authored by
party-appointed arbitrators where the party that appointed them
did not prevail.
IV. TOWARDS A MORE MATURE CULTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AND THE
DOCTRINE OF DISSENT
Park recently asked whether arbitration had reached its
"autumn."" We ask instead whether investment arbitration,
arguably in its teenage years if measured from the boom of the
mid-1990s, finally has bloomed into adolescence. Even if one
accepts the criticisms asserted against dissenting opinions by
commentators such as van den Berg, can they be simply labeled
"growing pains"?
The central role of dissents cannot be severed from the work-
ings of investor-state arbitration in an environment of economic
globalization. Although, as described, critics of dissenting opinions
assert that separate writings undermine the authority of invest-
ment arbitration awards (often with just a single sentence "discus-
sion" of the proposition"), it is apparent that this reasoning may
75. Id. at 831.
76. William W. Park, Arbitration in Autumn, 2 J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 1
(2011).
77. See, e.g., van den Berg, supra note 4, at 831.
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be somewhat short-sighted, narrow, and unduly draconian.
Indeed, taking a more deliberate view, some commentators have
observed, and we agree, that dissenting opinions can play a "criti-
cal role in fostering the legitimacy of international arbitration,
particularly investment arbitration."" This theory is supported by
at least two premises, each of which has ample standing when
considering the historical development of dissents. First, the pub-
lic will have greater confidence in a system in which dissent is
publicly aired because transparency provides greater assurances
of a fair and equitable process. Second, dissents will facilitate the
development of legal principles, which is otherwise handicapped
by a dearth of precedential (even if only persuasive) guidance."
Among the most elementary criticisms of dissenting opinions
in investment arbitration is that judicial and arbitral decision-
making are not equivalent. This observation ostensibly is potent
when considering that much of the doctrinal support for dissents
relates to their prevalence in institutions such as the U.S.
Supreme Court, which are tribunals of last resort. The critics,
however, fail to consider the evolution of investment arbitration in
modern international law while simultaneously either ignoring or
providing perfunctory recognition to the political and economic
exigencies that public international law imposes on arbitration.
When considered in this light - even though it may seem remark-
able because of the significant attention accorded to investment
arbitration over the last decade - the law of nations only recently
has come to terms with the implications of international invest-
ment arbitration. In very short order investment arbitration has
crafted and occupied a previously non-existing space, formerly
only modestly regulated by diplomatic channels." Although not
formally tribunals of "last resort", investor-state tribunals func-
tionally represent the only remedy available to parties seeking
relief in the form of international investment protection.
Irrespective of the forum (ad hoc or treaty based), interna-
tional public acceptance and trust remains the sine qua non of a
credible and legitimate system of investment arbitration. Trust,
however, is not simply satisfied by transparency and confidence in
fairness. Predictability is also required. The less than narrow uni-
78. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 25.
79. See van den Berg, supra note 4, at 826-27.
80. Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, Internatinoal Arbitration in Times of Change: Fairness
and Transparency in Investor-State Disputes, 104 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 591, 592
(2010).
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verse of material issues shall doubtless contribute to some con-
stant level of uncertainty. The presence of this uncertainty will
not diminish merely because the grounds deliberated are ulti-
mately published in the form of a dissenting opinion. Yet, total
and systemic iron-clad unanimity not only inhibits doctrinal
development, but also raises the specter of "smoke-filled" room
decision-making.'
In formulating and evaluating premises on the viability of a
dissent rubric in international treaty-based arbitration, commen-
tators have neglected to consider the very particular and singular
role of arbitrators processing disputes within the framework of
public international law. This omission is material to the dialogue.
The paucity of meaningful scholarship on this point perhaps has
its genesis in the very foundations of international investment
arbitration, which in large measure is predicated on international
commercial arbitration with respect to arbitral practice. Accord-
ingly, the role of arbitrators in international commercial arbitra-
tion and international treaty-based arbitral proceedings often is
blurred.8 2 This ill-conceived equivocation is central to understand-
ing the connection between the role of arbitrators in investor-state
arbitration and the doctrine of dissent.
The development of international commercial arbitration is
most saliently characterized by its promise to provide efficient and
expeditious practical solutions to disputes arising from commer-
cial relationships within the ambit of private international law."
International commercial arbitration is organized around
precepts of party-autonomy, privacy, and virtually absolute lack of
transparency as to the arbitral panel's "justice dispensing" delib-
eration. This lack of transparency extends to the premises under-
lying findings of fact, application of law to facts, and the weighing
of legal authority by the panel.
Central to the configuration of international commercial arbi-
tration is its unique character pursuant to which disputes are
81. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 44-48.
82. See, e.g., A. REDFERN AND M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 66 (4th Ed. 2004) (identifying bilateral investment treaties
as a network of international investment law that configures commercial arbitration).
83. Indeed, one of the principal badges of prejudice that hampered the
development of international commercial arbitration so that it would be deemed to be
in pari materia with judicial actions was the general proposition that international
commercial arbitration was designed to resolve only simple commercial disputes
arising between private parties and not controversies arising from complex cross-
border transactions. See PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (2009).
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processed beyond the realm of the state's exercise of sovereignty
through a judicial system-in fact, parallel to the workings of the
sovereign's judicial branch of government and intersecting only
when absolutely necessary.8 4 The imperatives that private inter-
national law engrafts on arbitrators do not require that they con-
sider: (i) public policy concerning applicable legislation, (ii)
national policy, (iii) micro or macroeconomic consequences, (iv) the
effects of the award in the development of an arbitral jurispru-
dence, (v) the manner in which an award may shape a particular
industry sector, or (vi) the workings of a particular award within a
system of international law constituted by an intricate and seem-
ingly unrelated network of bilateral and regional investment
treaties.
Viewed through this prism, the orthodox role of arbitrators is
that of an impartial and independent decision maker who aspires
to craft a practical commercial resolution to a private dispute pur-
suant to a process of deliberation that shall never be disclosed to
the parties or rendered susceptible to public scrutiny, let alone
forever reduced to writing to form part of the public domain."
Consequently, wrested from the arbitrator is any imperative to
further the public welfare or otherwise contribute to the develop-
ment of a corpus of jurisprudence. 6
Within the sphere of international commercial arbitration,
framed by private international law and the substantive law of a
particular state, the principles governing the enforceability of an
award are accorded primacy over the ratio decidendi and the
deliberative process. Because jurisdiction is premised on a con-
tractual relationship between private parties, the state's welfare
and public policy are wholly segregated from the process. Also, the
subject matter of disputes commonly aired within a matrix of
international commercial arbitration generally does not concern
the administrative or regulatory space of states. Commercial con-
tractual concerns, and less frequently business torts, envelope the
standard fare of issues duly explored.
84. Most notably these intersections typically occur (i) when injunctive relief is
sought pre-panel constitution, (ii) as part of compulsory practice in the gathering of
evidence or presentation of witnesses, and (iii) at the recognition and enforcement
phase.
85. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Arbitrator: One Man-Three Roles: Some
Independent Comments on the Ethical and Legal Obligations of an Arbitrator, 5 J.
Int'l Arb. 1, 7 (1988).
86. Id.
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A. Of Dissents and Other Disinfectants: Transparency
and Public International Law
As noted, treaty-based arbitration stands in sharp relief to its
international commercial arbitration counterpart. Investor-state
arbitral proceedings rest on public international law, specifically a
constellation of approximately 3,000 bilateral, multilateral, and
regional investment treaties mostly individually and indepen-
dently negotiated within an over-arching structural framework in
order to impose uniformity of terms and purpose. Investment
treaties serve as fundamental normative premises for jurisdiction,
adopting a malleable principle of consent pursuant to which a
host-state's offer to settle a dispute with an investor is memorial-
ized in a dispute-resolution clause within a treaty ." Conse-
quently, the subject matter of investor-state arbitration is
eminently and inextricably intertwined with the host-state's exer-
cise and application of its regulatory authority, administrative
jurisprudence, public policy, and positive law." It follows that the
processing of a treaty-based arbitration necessarily must be con-
ducted within the parameters of a deliberative process framed by
public policy and state welfare considerations that generally
encompass fundamental tenets of international investment law.
In this context, the arbitrator is hardly charged with a strictly
commercial agenda devoid of political, let alone transnational,
public policy concerns."
The role of arbitrators in investor-state arbitration commands
transparency as to premises supporting final conclusions of fact,
law, and the application of law to fact embodied in a particular
arbitral award. The exigencies of public international law on the
role of arbitrators additionally require the crafting of arbitral
awards that are primarily premised on objective doctrinal consid-
erations. These parallel the subjective concerns typified by a com-
mercial solution perceived to be in the best interest of all parties
to a private commercial dispute. The international dispute resolu-
tion framework predicated on public international law nourishes
its legitimacy from the pristine and academic objectivity of doctri-
87. As shall be discussed, this configuration also is material to the doctrine of
dissent and must form part of any discussion on the subject.
88. Charles N. Brower & Stephen W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to
the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 483-489
(2008-2009).
89. Id. at 490.
90. See van den Berg, supra note 4, at 824, 831.
2012] 467
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3
nal precepts underlying arbitration awards fashioned as part of a
normative system of arbitral jurisprudence.
In addition, the role of arbitrators in public international law
requires arbitrators to sift through an elaborate corpus of arbitral
precedent so that they may imbue general causes of action-based
upon such vague and undefined terms as "denial of justice", "full
protection and security", "fair and equitable treatment", "public
purpose", and "national treatment"-with particular meaning
purporting to reconcile the proactive regulatory space of the State
with the policy objectives of public international law in the arena
of foreign investment protection. This exercise of interpretation
must be public, objective, and analytical if it is at all to aspire to
be legitimate. Normativity, legitimacy, and objectivity in turn are
deeply connected to the transparency of the deliberation process
and recourse to conventional and customary public international
law.
Because "mechanical jurisprudence"" is shunned in favor of
transparency of process and analysis in the creation of arbitral
jurisprudence, it behooves the framework here described to under-
score dissents as an integral and necessary part of its architec-
ture. The jurisprudence of dissenting opinions bolsters the tenets
of (i) transparency of process in connection with the final findings,
i.e., transparency generally, and (ii) objectivity in the identifica-
tion, interpretation, and application of principles of international
customary conventional law.92 Because the ratio decidendi is not
hidden or obscured somewhere behind the four corners of an
award, the parties to treaty-based arbitration, in stipulating to
non-discriminatory treatment, have subscribed to a process that
envisions full disclosure (complete and not insubstantial trans-
parency) and objectivity as guiding principles within a rubric of
existing arbitral jurisprudence that defies stare decisis but
remains as a persuasive non-binding juridical standard.
Consequently, the majority of investment instruments,
including treaties and State contracts, are mere points of depar-
ture in the process of adjudicating a treaty-based investor-state
arbitration in accordance with parties' expectations. The role of
arbitrators in the complex and organic domain of public interna-
tional law is one that necessarily entails more than the rote appli-
cation of static concepts. At the same time this task is tempered
with readily available jurisprudence preventing arbitrators from
91. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
92. Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 43-48.
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morphing into Dworkin's metaphoric "Judge Hercules", an ideal
jurist who is charged with contemplating the practically infinite
universe of data so as to identify the single just and true answer.93
The role of arbitrators in treaty-based arbitration requires
that arbitrators borrow from the milieu of arbitral jurisprudence
and international law, as identified in Article 38 of the Statute of
the I.C.J. in order to synthesize jurisprudence within the confines
of the specific factual matrix presented by a particular dispute. If
a critical aspect of an arbitrator's role in investor-state arbitration
is to generate arbitral jurisprudence, this function cannot be dis-
sociated from the fashioning of a well-reasoned award where the
governing principles and applicable facts can be reduced to a dis-
senting opinion having a rational foundation that is comparable to
or greater than the award's prevailing majority view.
In his noted survey of the American common law system, Karl
N. Llewellyn observed:
were the public ever to harbor a suspicion that courts were
not acting aboveboard, the dissenting opinion guarantees
the public than any bending of the law will see the light of
day. And not just that. The dissenting opinion also guaran-
tees the public that judges are on the job, that in the cham-
bers where a panel's deliberations take place, judges join
battle over the law, each judge feeling individually respon-
sible for the panel's decisions.94
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis more con-
cisely stated the same principle when he observed, "[s]unlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants."95 The general premise that
dissenting opinions elevate the authority of decision-making
tribunals by conveying to the public that a fair process has been
undertaken and stands parallel to Llewellyn's assertion that
"judges have no need whatsoever to present a united front to the
outside world in order for the law and the courts to be held in high
esteem."96
Thus considered, one might conclude that van den Berg's own
study is a consequence of the very transparency it eschews and
may in fact foster further refinement in the process of selecting
93. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977). See also JURGAN
HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND ALL GELTUNG 258 (1st ed. 1992).
94. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 989,
1002-1003 (1988) (P. Gewirtz ed.) (M. Ansaldi trans.).
95. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, Harper's Weekly, Dec. 20, 1913, at
10, available at http://www.law.louisville.edullibrary/collections/brandeis/node/196.
96. Llewellyn, supra note 81, at 1002 (emphasis in original).
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impartial arbitrators (not the doctrine of dissent) in investment
arbitration. Were van den Berg's conclusions regarding the corre-
lation between party appointments and the authorship of dissent-
ing opinions accepted,97 it becomes apparent that light will have
been shed on an unfortunate phenomenon that has little to do
with dissents but a great deal to say on the "impartiality" of arbi-
trators that function within a system that is party-appointment
driven and premised on the precept of impartiality. Van den
Berg's inquiry merely begs the question whether the equitable
administration of justice suffers equally with the doctrine of dis-
sent where the fundamental assumption of impartiality is
wanting.
Light, the disinfectant, is doing its work. Far from undercut-
ting the phenomenon of dissenting opinions, van den Berg's study
may serve as a boon to their long term development by perma-
nently extracting a cancerous cause that he may not have sought
to identify in the first instance.
B. The Rule of Reason
The normative or constructive function of arbitrators operates
in tandem with an obligation to identify reasoned arguments that
bestow legitimacy to the arbitration process itself. Significantly,
that this "reasoning" requirement finds a home in the role of arbi-
trators applying public international law is hardly new, yet it con-
tinues to stir the imagination of commentators analyzing
international investment law." What seems to have been omitted
from the literature, however, has been the necessary connection
between the tenets of transparency, reason, and objectivity, and
the jurisprudence of dissents. Transparency of the grounds ana-
lyzed during the deliberation process and the primacy of the pro-
cess itself simply cannot be attained if arbitrators are proscribed
from articulating and publishing reasoned dissents. Foreclosing
dissenting opinions as part of an arbitration award would be
equivalent to the adoption of privacy and secrecy doctrines as
determinative in proceedings governed by application of public
international law.
The force of reason as embodied in an arbitration award
would be vastly diminished, if not altogether eviscerated, were
97. Although the correlation that van den Berg reveals is troubling, it does not
necessarily, as Brower and Rosenberg point out, conclusively establish causation.
98. See, e.g., THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (G. Aguilar Alvarez and W. M. Reisman eds. 2008).
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arbitrators compelled to refrain from issuing dissents. Similarly,
the normative foundation that a guiding rule of reason imparts on
arbitral jurisprudence would be meaningfully lessened if dissents
had to be carved out of arbitration awards. The articulation of rea-
soned propositions that were considered but not adopted by a
majority of panel members broadens and completes the scope of
perennial internal dialogue that is endemic to decisional law.
Therefore, the role of arbitrators applying public international law
must necessarily comprise the dissent methodology if a rule of rea-
son is to be rigorously observed and applied as a basis of norma-
tive standing.99
The role of the arbitrators in investor-state arbitrations is
materially more akin to that of a judge in a judicial system than to
international commercial arbitration to the extent that both judge
and investor-state arbitrator must weigh public policy and social
welfare principles germane to applicable substantive law. An
investor-state proceeding requires compliance with international
expectations of legitimacy, which are more far-reaching and
diverse than even the national expectation of legitimacy that
national courts must meet.' 00 The public nature of an investor-
state arbitral proceeding is international and not national. Inter-
national arbitration concerns States despite the "investor-state"
standing configuration, where an investor-claimant seeks relief
from a host-state respondent. The process of adjudication in an
investor-state arbitration entails consideration of international
standards pertaining to the definition of "investments" and even
the nature and character of property, the policies and objectives of
international investment law, as well as public findings on issues
within the exclusive ambit of national-domestic law.
The intimate and inextricable connection between a superna-
tional forum applying public international law, the particular rel-
evant States and the more general policies incident to a
transnational network of bilateral and multilateral investment
99. Significantly, the ICSID system contemplates the former requirement of a
reasoned opinion upon penalty, at least theoretically, of annulment. Article 52 (1)(e)
reads:
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or
more of the following grounds:
e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is
based.
100. See discussion of authority of arbitral awards in Brower & Rosenberg, supra
note 43, at 44-48.
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treaties compels the issuance of dissents in arbitration awards if
in fact the legitimacy arising from predictability is to be preserved
and enhanced. The role of arbitrators in this domain entails a
duty to issue awards that address the expectations of a public that
surpasses the narrow universe of just the parties to the arbitral
proceeding. This responsibility certainly is not shared by arbitra-
tors presiding over international commercial arbitration cases
within the sphere of private international law. In these latter pro-
ceedings, predictability, which still remains a formidable chal-
lenge to international commercial arbitration and a promise that
it has yet to redeem, is circumscribed to the parties to the dispute
as the award does not contemplate an imperative to contribute to
an arbitral jurisprudence, nor does it seek to address or redress
public policy considerations.
The heightened responsibility imposed upon arbitrators
laboring to enforce "fair and equitable treatment" and non-dis-
criminatory application of justice in the relationship between
States and investors undeniably involves a heightened commit-
ment to the principle of predictability. Obscuring or altogether
omitting a holistic treatment of issues and possible conclusions,
which necessarily includes the publication of dissents, can hardly
be contemplated if the requisite level of predictability and expec-
tations are to be met. 101
C. Customary International Law
The literature discussing the propriety of dissents in investor-
state arbitration has elected to ignore that the role of arbitrators,
which includes authoring dissents, forms part of customary inter-
national law. It is here asserted that the undertaking of dissent
craftsmanship rests in a normative space that far exceeds loose
customary practice. Because of this standing, any effort to modify
101. Achieving predictability of result remains a goal that international
commercial arbitration has yet to achieve. The promotion of secrecy and non-
transparency as integral principles of the deliberation process, the absence of an
imperative to articulate fully and comprehensively the issues considered and reasons
for the adoption of specific principles to the detriment of competing precepts, less than
uniform and conventional rules for procedure, the virtual non-existence of evidentiary
rules, the absence of discovery in view of a restrictive and developing rubric
facilitating the gathering of evidence, and meaningful disparity in the skills of
arbitrators, in the view of many are conducive to lack of predictive value attendant to
results. This absence of predictability, which arises from the very structure of
international commercial arbitration, cannot be imported to international arbitration
(investor-state arbitral proceedings) without meaningfully impairing the entire
systems' legitimacy.
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the practice, let alone eviscerate it, must be balanced against the
consequences of disavowing a legitimately established and
accepted norm of public international law. 102
It is hardly disputed that States have assented to the practice
of arbitrators authoring dissenting opinions when sitting in super-
national fora and applying public international law. This practice
has been both constant and uniform. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute
of the I.C.J. explicitly references international custom "as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law." In addition, Art.
38(1)(c) speaks to "the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations," as a standard of international law to be considered
in the adjudication of disputes. The elements defining the suffi-
ciency of State practice so as to give rise to binding customary
international law has been eloquently and succinctly articulated
in the Asylum and Rite of Passage cases: "The party which relies
on custom. . . must prove that this custom is established in a man-
ner that has become binding on the other party. . . that the rule
invoked. .. is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage,
practiced by the State. . .."
The elements of "constancy" and "uniformity" of usage identi-
fied in the ICJ's opinion, which materially concern frequency and
duration, are amply met concerning the practice of issuing dis-
senting opinions.1 04 State practice in the fashioning of investor-
102. Van den Berg, in the very first sentence of his carefully reasoned contribution,
remarks that "[d]issenting opinions appear to have become an accepted practice in
international arbitration." Van den Berg, supra note 4, at 821 (emphasis supplied).
Even though the author's studious use of the word "appears" lessens just a shade the
proposition's claim and is somewhat inexplicable, just paragraphs later the doctrine of
dissent's legitimate place in customary international law is amply vindicated with
direct references to the Permanent Court of International Justices', and its successor,
the International Court of Justices' adoption of the dissent doctrine. Id. at 822-23.
Similarly, the author details the conventional history of dissents with respect to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Art. 48(4), June 10, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160. See Id. at
822 n.5 (emphasis supplied). The treatment or possible amendment of the doctrine,
however, as a modification or deletion of a settled norm of customary international
law is not one that the author elects to explore or at all consider.
103. See IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 69 (2008) (citing Asylum (Colombia v.
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 276 (Nov. 20); Rite of Passage (Portugal v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 40
(April 12)) (emphasis added).
104. Frequency and duration as critical elements in the formation and
transformation of customary international law have been relaxed, in the views of
most commentators, as a result of information, globalization, and the efficiencies and
expediencies that characterize contemporary international relations. Accordingly,
absolute or "complete uniformity" is not required. Fact-specific determinations arising
from the idiosyncrasies of specific factual cases shall be deemed to be controlling. See
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state arbitral awards can be inferred from State action at different
phases of the process, commencing with acceptance of dispute res-
olution clauses in treaties contemplating that dissents form part
of the arbitral process. Indeed, the opinio juris component to cus-
tomary international law requires manifest evidence of a State's
subjective conviction, and the conclusion of a treaty itself consti-
tutes acceptance of a customary practice. 05
The question of whether dissents are viable and have a place
in investor-state arbitration cannot be comprehensively and
meaningfully addressed without properly contextualizing dissents
as a State practice that forms part of customary international law.
Amending this practice entails abandoning the legitimacy that
customary international law bestows upon a specific practice that
it embraces. Thus, any deliberate modification in State practices
acknowledged to form part of customary international law must
be balanced against the negative implications that generally flow
from such amendments. The particular case concerning issuance
of dissents, tothe extent that the publication of dissenting opin-
ions is to be viewed as an international acceptance of a process
committed to transparency of the premises considered in the fash-
ioning of an arbitration award, constitutes a stark shift from
transparency and disclosure to privacy and secrecy as preferred
general principles of public international law. The consequences of
such a shift are beyond the purview of this contribution.
D. Dissents and the Development of Legal Principles:
Precedent and a New Normative Space
The absence of precedent (stare decisis) as a distinct and
unique feature of arbitral jurisprudence grants particular norma-
tive significance to the customary international practice of dissent
craftsmanship. Arbitral awards occupy a very unique normative
space that, very much like the principle of comity, can be viewed
as a type of imperative that has greater weight than a mere cour-
tesy to be followed, but less than an obligation that must be
applied. 0 ' The persuasive but non-binding nature of treaty-based
arbitral awards certainly invites, if not altogether requires, a com-
United States Nationals in Morocco case (U.S. v. Morocco), 1952 I.C.J. Reports 176
(August 27).
105. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 99-
101 (June 2007).
106. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See also PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-
FRAGA, THE NEW ROLE OF COMITY IN PRIVATE PROCEDURAL LAw (2007).
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prehensive account of the legal reasoning supporting a specific
finding. The articulation of the premises and structure giving rise
to a particular decision can best serve and nourish customary
international law where a corresponding antinomy to premises
and conclusions is fully presented. The normative space that "per-
suasive authority" occupies is maximized in its legitimacy when
coupled with a reasoned antithesis. The adoption, as persuasive
authority, of a majority view expressed in an arbitration award is
most compelling (i.e., persuasive) as to both form and substance in
cases where the proponent of the authority can publicly communi-
cate having considered thoroughly a diverging view by dint of cit-
ing to analysis that thoroughly articulates such a view in the form
a dissent.
In addition, from a merely structural perspective, customary
international law in the form of arbitral jurisprudence can best
serve its organic and flexible characteristics pursuant to a con-
stant and uniform practice that renders ubiquitous the possibility
of doctrinal change or amendment. The majesty of "a common law
of arbitral jurisprudence" rests precisely in being capable of creat-
ing a body of authority capable of yielding systemic and gradual,
but still meaningful, conceptual and doctrinal change. The cus-
tomary international practice of fashioning dissents in arbitration
awards is indispensable to this purpose. In this regard, the que-
ries incident to the practice of authoring dissents compel reformu-
lation to include the role and contributions of the practice of
dissents to the normative rubric of decisional jurisprudence. A
comprehensive examination of the issue can hardly be exhausted
merely by engaging in a less-than-complete empirical analysis
that principally relies on a correlation between the non-prevailing
party and the appointment of arbitrators. The concerns being
explored are slightly more complex and far-reaching.
In this regard, Llewellyn engaged in an experiment that mer-
its reconsideration in the context of investment arbitration:
When two asserted rules are in conflict, it will usually
involve a situation in which both opinions have something
right and something not right about them, and where both
disputants have made the same methodological error,
namely, framing a single rule so broadly that it encom-
passes unlike fact situations. The specific cases that actu-
ally occur to one judge are correctly decided under his rule.
It is just that he has phrased his rule so broadly that the
language encompasses the specific cases that occurred to
the other judge too, which might have been decided better
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under the latter's rule. In every conflict, people think in
terms of antinomies, of overbroad generalizations, of thesis
and antithesis. Happily, though, it is easier to devise a
needed synthesis, the third (and, until this point in the pro-
cess, unrecognized) possible solution, if the antinomies are
accentuated and fought over right at the very start, rather
than if the judges wait until later to figure out what they
are. A judge needing to decide a case which poses a novel
issue for him gains more insight if he has two previously
decided cases to peruse rather than only one. This gain in
insight is especially evident when the earlier cases the
judge come from states other than his own, so that he need
not regard the majority view taken in those cases as having
the force of precedent.1 o7
Given the final caveat, this remarkable insight into the decision-
maker's reasoning would apply with equal force in investment
arbitration where previous decisions, though retaining considera-
ble persuasive authority, lack the force of stare decisis.
V. CONCLUSION
Dissents will play an important role in the continued develop-
ment of investment arbitration. The current debate regarding the
use of dissents in investment arbitration awards cannot be sepa-
rated from the rise of precedent-based reasoning and argument in
investment arbitration. Despite the persistent objections of critics,
a modern theory of dissent continues to develop that merges the
shared experience of the common and civil law systems, both of
which share a history of openness with regard to dissenting opin-
ions in judicial decision-making. Although it remains true that
arbitral jurisprudence lacks binding precedential authority, the
increasing prevalence of dissenting opinions may serve to elevate
the precedential authority of arbitral decisions and foster greater
confidence in the process. Moreover, a thorough evaluation of the
dissent doctrine must address the nature of dissents as forming
part of customary international law, and the role of arbitration in
the realm of public international law. Absent these considera-
tions, any evaluation or re-evaluation of dissent theory would be
incomplete.
To be sure, consideration of an amendment to or elimination
107. Llewellyn, supra note 81, at 1001 (emphasis in original) (Llewellyn's
comments here are not limited to dissenting opinions, but separate opinions
generally).
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of the doctrine of dissent presents multifaceted challenges that
are systemic and therefore overarching with respect to a frame-
work of international dispute resolution premised on public inter-
national law. Taking into account the firmly planted position of
dissents both in the national legal systems of common and civil
law jurisdictions, and its widespread adoption in international
practice, however, it would seem that such efforts would be of lim-
ited utility if not entirely fruitless. The never dissent principle is
daunting and perhaps even discouraging to a serious effort seek-
ing to bring into being the perfect workings of the dissent doctrine.
Instead, as we have here asserted, dissents will play an important
role in the continued development of international arbitration.
Given this promise, does not the very scope of this challenge com-
pel the undertaking of the task?
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